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Abstract 
This article provides critical reflections on the Conference of the Law, 
Literature and Humanities Association of Australasia, held on 12-14 
December 2017 at La Trobe University and the University of Melbourne, 
Australia. The conference theme of dissents and dispositions ‘invited 
consideration of the arrangements and rearrangements of the conduct of 
law and life; of the dispositions of law and jurisprudence, and how these 
relate to dissents, resistance and transformation.’ Speakers discussed 
law, literature, public art, visuality, media, gender and sexuality. The 
various papers collectively raised questions of how the law is, through art 
and other mediums, arranged and subsequently – sometimes violently 
and sometimes politely – rearranged, constantly in a process of 
developing, evolving, never finishing, and always applying its words and 
touch to new circumstances. 
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Article Text 
Tom Nicholson’s Towards a Monument to Batman’s Treaty was the 
artwork for the Conference of the Law, Literature and Humanities 
Association of Australasia held in Melbourne in December 2017, if a 
conference can have an artwork. The installation, which comprised 
strewn chimney bricks collected from citizens in and around the town of 
Healesville some 50 kilometres north-east from Melbourne surrounded 
by possible memorial plaques, seemed (strangely, perhaps) fitting. It 
recalled the conference’s situation on the land of the Wurundjeri peoples 
exploited by but not ceded to colonisers. The as-yet-unrealised nature of 
the artwork/monument, with its strewn materials and multiple possible 
plaques, seemed too to reflect the theme of law, literature and the 
humanities as constantly in a process of developing, never finishing. All 
are disciplines open to differing creative interpretations; all are 
inherently creative. To quote, as one of the speakers did, from the West 
Funding: see p 140 
Peer review: This article 
has been subject to a 
double-blind peer review 
process 
 
© Copyright: The 
Authors. This article is 
issued under the terms of 
the Creative Commons 
Attribution Non-
Commercial Share Alike 
License, which permits 
use and redistribution of 
the work provided that 
the original author and 
source are credited, the 
work is not used for 
commercial purposes and 
that any derivative works 
are made available under 
the same license terms.  
Exchanges: The Interdisciplinary Research Journal 
 133 Mulcahy. Exchanges 2018 5(2), pp. 132-140 
 
Australian Interpretation Act 1984, ‘a written law shall be considered as 
always speaking’ (s 8), always applying its words and touch to new 
circumstances, constantly evolving. Similarly, the papers at the 
conference flowed into discussions and conversations that tested 
disciplinary boundaries and reshaped the original work in different ways. 
Perhaps fittingly, Marianne Constable (California Berkeley) started the 
conference with a keynote address on repetition in legal speech and 
action and how it produces and interrupts rhythms. Constable argued 
that repetition leads to a certain kind of senselessness in that it can 
desensitise or disorientate, allowing one to not think or decide how or 
what to do next to such an extent that something becomes second 
nature or habit. She posed precedent as a system of repetition, and that 
the repetitive nature of precedent does not allow space for questioning 
except in interruption; it is only interruption that breaks habit. The 
discussion that followed introduced the idea of the law as automaton. 
However, against this thesis, Constable suggested that repetition could 
actually sensitise us. In this respect, there are phases of response to 
repetition. It may emphasise at first, but then desensitise; possibly, we 
tune in and out. She concluded with a discussion of what the difference is 
between repetition and interruption that (de)sensitises and 
(de)emphasises. 
In a panel on ‘Crossings’, Olivia Barr and Laura Peterson (Melbourne) 
explored public art as public law, drawing on the idea of the artist and 
jurist as crafters or creators. Despite the move to transient or pop-up 
public art, Barr and Peterson posed the notion of public art as solid 
versus public law as transient. Drawing on Andreas Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos’ notion of ‘lawscape’ (2015), the two argued that public art 
produces legal relations in a city. Public art provides an opportunity to 
slow, pause, engage and remember and the act of viewing of public art 
and law draws bodies in space. The paper raised interesting questions of 
how we interpret public art and the role of commissioning in public art. 
During the discussion that followed, they suggested that, in the case of 
certain public art such as Laurel Nannup’s First Contact, through the 
commissioning process the state owns up to its mistakes to some extent. 
The exploration of public art continued in Ross Gibson’s (Canberra) paper 
on his artwork, Bluster Town. The artwork, which had resonances with 
Julius Popp’s bit.fall and the ‘word wall’ in Melbourne Theatre Company’s 
Sumner Theatre, explored the transience of common words as against 
the permanence of legal word. Gibson suggested that art always happens 
in a joint, a turning point; that art causes a turn, impels, jostles and 
moves. He conceived of public art as a ‘conviviality enhancement system’ 
and argued that there is a possibility of relationship and connectivity 
when people are put together in public art and public law. Finally, Dave 
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McDonald (Melbourne) spoke on the ribbons tied around fences to mark 
clergy abuse in the town of Ballarat in an artistic-legal phenomenon 
referred to as ‘loud fence’; the term being a reference to both the 
colourful ribbons and the noise they made when blowing in the wind. 
McDonald argued that the ribbons were a powerful visual testimony 
similar to crime scene tape – a closing off or border that draws attention 
to the space by passers-by. His paper explored the practices, possibilities 
and limitations of visual memorialisation. To encounter public art is 
affective, but people can simply walk by. 
In another panel on ‘Border crossings’, Maria Elander (La Trobe) explored 
images as evidence, and suggested that there are other means of 
ascertaining facts beyond law, including through art. Elander argued that 
there is a need to treat images critically not as a repository for truth and 
that images are not facts but rather pose questions of belief; it is 
questionable whether we are able to draw a ‘correct’ reading of a 
photograph. In this sense, images have an evidentiary role and an 
imaginary role. Victims sometimes testify using images of loved ones; for 
example, during the Luke Batty coronial inquest, a framed photograph of 
Luke sat near the coroner’s bench. There is thus an affective dimension 
to images. Images can be, like victim impact statements, a form of 
therapeutic justice. Law, however, has a tendency to ignore scholarship 
of the visual, and images seldom find their way into judgments. This idea 
continued in Sarah Hook’s (Western Sydney) paper on legal responses to 
parody. The legal regulation of parody and satire contained in section 
41A of the Australian Copyright Act is only fairly new, introduced in 2006. 
Hook questioned the role of the judiciary as artistic interpreters and the 
idea of judges determining artistic measure, instead suggesting that art 
practitioners and lawmakers need to talk to each other. Hook argued 
that parody relies on distance just as much as similarity and that critical 
distance is essential. There is, in parody, an oscillation between empathy 
or nearness and distance or opposition. Courts, however, rely too readily 
on dictionaries to define what parody is, ignoring complex meanings; 
dictionaries cannot define complex phenomena. A clash seemed to 
emerge over whether interpretation of parody is dependent on authorial 
intentionality or whether the work can speak for itself, that is, whether it 
is defined by the interpretation of its audience. Further interesting 
questions were raised by Hook over whether one can have parody 
without humour, whether humour is in the eye of the beholder, what is a 
‘fair motive’ for parody, whether scathing parody is fair, and the literary 
versus legal takes on these questions. 
Another panel on ‘Evidence of things seen’ opened with Penny Crofts 
(Technology Sydney) who explored corporations personalised through art 
and film with a focus on the television series, Stranger Things. Ashley 
Exchanges: The Interdisciplinary Research Journal 
 135 Mulcahy. Exchanges 2018 5(2), pp. 132-140 
 
Pearson’s (Griffith) paper that followed examined (legal) persona in video 
games and other media, describing persona as something of a contest 
between self and a legal mask that shrouds the self as a reasonable, 
rational, agentic subject. One particularly interesting element of this 
paper was the discussion on the experience of the player’s body in game-
play and its relation to the avatar, which raised interesting questions 
regarding the role of the player. Is an avatar’s selfhood negotiated and 
defined through the interactivity with the human player that controls and 
plays with the avatar? What are the impacts of immediacy and the speed 
of fighting in game-play on the creation of the avatar’s self? The 
discussion recalled the sex surrogate scene in Her wherein the lead 
character attempts to manifest his beloved operating system in human 
form but ultimately fails.  
Finally, for this panel, Carolyn McKay’s (Sydney) paper on her recent work 
Model Prison explored visual art as a research methodology drawing 
from the ‘visual turn’ in humanities and social sciences. McKay’s work 
was a video installation that depicted a ‘virtual prison’ with an actor 
inside who paced, bent, stretched and crouched. The work sat next to 
Lucas Davidson’s durational performance, Black Cell, wherein the artist 
was buried under a pile of gravel and, in so doing, created a visceral 
experience of audience anxiety. McKay’s work explored not so much the 
textual but rather the material and sensorial dimensions of incarceration, 
decorporealised and dematerialised through video link. Through the 
medium of video, there was a removal of bodily presence, with the body 
digitally encased and hermetically sealed, like that of Davidson’s. The 
work was accompanied by a striking audioscape of ambient noise and 
strange sounds picked up on location at The Lock-Up, an arts space and 
former police station in Newcastle. The audio in McKay’s work became 
irritating, repetitive and looped, like the movement. The audio, to some 
degree, created the space. The placement of the screens in the art space 
that forced the audience to bend down to see created a different 
experience than if the audience was to view the work on a flat screen 
and again emulated the contortions of the body in the film. McKay’s 
piece was reminiscent of works of audioscapes installed in padded cells, 
like Love Without Sound’s Reasons for Admission. Her work also had 
resonances with Lawrence Abu Hamdan’s Model Court and Judy Radul’s 
World Rehearsal Court. McKay also spoke of the role of gut instincts in 
artistic creation and the importance of openness to creative thought and 
then deploying the artist’s critical gaze; all of relevance to practice-led or 
-based research. For those that want to continue the viewing and 
exploring these questions in greater depth, McKay’s latest project is 
justiceINjustice, a collaborative work at The Lock-Up exploring injustice 
and marginalisation. 
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During the discussion that followed into lunch, a question arose as to 
who the audience was to these television programs, video games and 
artworks. This in turn raised a problem of art: that it often speaks merely 
to the converted. Can art transform the viewer if it is not viewed? Can 
the same question be asked of law or, indeed, the legal academic 
conference? Are we simply speaking to our peers or ourselves? What was 
striking about this panel and born out over the conference was the 
engagement with contemporary popular cultural forms that have 
resonance beyond the law.  
A post-lunch panel on ‘Visible addresses’ commenced with Katherine 
Biber (Technology Sydney) who discussed the cultural response to the 
infamous Lindy Chamberlain trial and subsequent appeals and acquittal 
that have spawned a number of artistic responses, including theatre 
productions and an opera, Lindy. The paper focused on the Lindy 
Chamberlain collection at the National Museum of Australia and raised 
interesting questions about restoring evidence, evidence as art and how 
evidence/art is described; for example, to describe an object/artwork as 
‘cut’ has a very different resonance to ‘torn’. Les Moran (Birkbeck) 
discussed the idea of performing one’s (legal) self through a case study 
on reality television judge Robert Rinder. The paper described how the 
impact of digital media has reshaped the idea of audience as consumer. 
Audience is now a major player in the production of a performance and 
operates as a quasi-jury with the judge as conductor of the proceedings. 
This framing of the audience is reminiscent of Jack Tan’s work, Karaoke 
Court, wherein the audience were jury to litigation undertaken through 
the medium of karaoke. Judicial character is created through different 
media genres. Judge Rinder appeared on Strictly Come Dancing, which 
Moran said was not about his capacity to perform the role of judge, but I 
wonder whether there is an element of dancing in the production of 
judgment and judicial character. Judge Rinder lip syncs have also 
appeared on YouTube. Moran described Judge Rinder as a camp gay 
figure of authority and raised the question of whether dandyism or camp 
is compatible with the construction of judicial authority, particularly in an 
era of bourgeois acceptability of same-sex marriage. Alison Young and 
Peter Rush (Melbourne) concluded the panel with an exploration of lives 
lived with law in the Japanese criminal justice system. In Japan, police 
now use street art, small neighbourhood police stations called ‘koban’, 
and mascots as a reminder, particularly to young people, that the 
neighbourhood is under governance. 
Karen Crawley’s (Griffith) powerful keynote address focused on the 
implausible post-racial politics of the recent television production of The 
Handmaid’s Tale. Crawley noted that the production had been lauded for 
its inclusivity in terms of casting, but had no critical reflection on race, 
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which she argued highlighted the limits of liberal inclusivity. Perhaps, she 
suggested, the slow endemic violence experienced by people of colour 
does not lend itself to visual narrative. In a close reading of one scene in 
which a black character escaped the Republic of Gilead, an authoritarian 
regime which took over the United States of America (and ironically the 
name of a pharmaceutical company that has been accused of preventing 
access to anti-HIV drugs in Australia due to over-pricing, as was pointed 
out in the discussion that followed), and was accepted as a refugee in 
Canada, Crawley noted how the character was depersonalised and cast 
as an ‘empty neutral vessel to receive the help of the state’; the 
character was never so dehumanised as when they were being treated 
humanely. Her triumphant escape was recast as a rescue, and she was 
depicted as an object of humanitarian pity. Her being believed as a 
refugee is a stark contrast to present-day Australia, yet the creation of 
Gilead has resonances to early Aboriginal Australia and the homogenous 
racial formation of the Australian state. The darkened lighting of the 
scenes broadcast during the paper seemed to exemplify just how colour 
was seeped out of the production. There was an implication of the 
(predominantly white) audience in Crawley’s critique, which demanded a 
radical rethinking of this feminist production.  
In another panel, Marco Wan (Hong Kong) opened with a paper on 
dispositions of LGBTQ rights in Hong Kong through the prism of the Gay 
Lovers television program that was censored by the decision of Cho Man 
Kit v Broadcasting Authority. Despite small advances, Wan argued that 
there is a paradoxical nature to queer visibility in Hong Kong in that 
heterosexuals are desexualised whereas gay and lesbian people tend to 
be sexualised. For gay people in Hong Kong, talking about themselves is a 
kind of nudity, and visibility can increase homophobia. In the second 
paper, Jan Mihal (Melbourne) explored notions of loyalty and dissent, 
observed how the interpretation of laws is akin to that of musical scores 
and raised questions of whether the judge/player must be loyal to the 
composer’s/legislator’s intention. Finally, Henry Kha (Auckland) discussed 
transgender marriage cases in the Asia-Pacific. Whilst the UK case of 
Corbett v Corbett that annulled a transgender marriage still dominates 
legal conceptions of sex and gender, it has been widely rejected in Asia-
Pacific. There is, however, still a focus on surgery in these cases and laws. 
This provides a sense of clarity in the judicial and legislative mind and a 
‘bright line’ on the recognition of gender. However, it goes against the 
wishes of transgender people who want to move from the dominance of 
the state and state instruments (doctors, judges) in determining gender 
and sex to a system of self-declaration. 
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In a later panel on ‘Art, culture and the vivid imagination’, Des 
Manderson (Australian National) opened with a discussion on 
temporalities of law in the visual arts. He discussed the here and now 
moment of viewing an image and opined that, to quote Georges Didi-
Huberman, ‘we are before the image as before the law’ (2003: 31). 
Manderson built on this idea of the temporal moment of viewing to 
argue that ‘the power of law is the power over time.’ In the second 
paper, Nikos Papastergiadis (Melbourne) considered art as events with 
particular attention to digital public art. He argued that there is no 
sociality or aesthetic appreciation or popular culture experience without 
mediation. It could be said that when we are on a phone, we are 
therefore alone, but it is really a mediated social interaction. 
Papastergiadis described how the experience of public artwork and its 
ambience often creates not focus but dispersal and distraction. Finally, 
Peter Rush (Melbourne) spoke on the audio-visual rhetoric of criminal 
confessions. He raised concerns with the location of confessions, with the 
closed and secluded room of a police station where most confessions 
take place being likened to a confessional. He also raised concerns 
around what was called in Arthurs v Western Australia ‘the 
“atmospherics” of the interview’: the tone of the voices, the movement 
of the body, and the idea of a rapt audience. In the discussion that 
followed, Rush drew from the idea of bodily confessions and discussed 
‘the event of the confession’ and how to make sense of the audio-visual 
montage. 
In a final panel on ‘Dispositions of the other’, Julen Etxabe (Helsinki) 
spoke on dialogues, in particular metaphors, and how we become captive 
to the metaphor or visual image we deploy. He also spoke of how judicial 
language speaks back, often – as was raised in the discussion that 
followed – in appeal. In a fascinating paper, Marett Leiboff (Wollongong) 
refigured Brown v Tasmania, which concerned former Green Party leader 
Bob Brown’s challenge to Tasmania’s anti-protest laws, as an embodied 
theatrical response to the idea of protest. In a close reading of the case, 
Leiboff posited that the High Court justices had lived through times of 
great protest – for example, Justice Virginia Bell was an actor who 
become a lawyer and represented Mardi Gras protestors who were 
engaged in a form of agitprop theatre – and an echo or memory of 
protest sat in the judgments. She suggested that exposure to protests 
can create an image in the mind’s eye and that this image can become a 
memory embedded in the (judicial) body. It is almost as if judgment is a 
mode of method acting, where the judge draws from emotional memory 
to perform the act of judgment. Leiboff’s mode of presentation was also 
striking. She moved about the conference stage as if driven by a 
Grotowskian impulse and, in so doing, reminded us her audience of the 
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connection between legal thought and the body. Finally, Laura-Jane 
Maher (Deakin) provided a close reading of the opening of a medical 
treatment case, Re Lucas, as an example of narrative judgment that 
positions the reader to empathise with the parties by drawing on their 
own lived experiences. The opening paragraphs of the judgment, which 
concerned access to hormone treatment for a transgender teenager, 
described how ‘the tension in the courtroom was palpable’, focussed on 
the facial and other expressions of the audience in the courtroom such as 
weeping and hugging, and explored the material impact on bodies in 
court and how Lucas and his family experienced the courtroom. Maher 
advanced the idea of judgments as autobiography, with judges using 
judgments to articulate their experiences as readers. However, this thesis 
was disputed during the discussion that followed. Perhaps what was 
happening in the opening lines of Re Lucas was the not the judge 
engaging in an autobiography but rather attempting a biography – 
perhaps even a pointing – of Lucas or even the courtroom itself. 
In this sense, what the court in Re Lucas was doing was exploring the 
disposition of the applicant and the courtroom that he (temporarily) 
inhabited, the character, arrangement and temperament of this young 
person and their space. The court also issued also a powerful dissent 
against a decision that it could not overrule, Re Jamie, which held that 
access to hormone treatment required court approval, concluding, in its 
final sentence that ‘the sooner that children such as Lucas and their 
families do not have to endure the ordeal of litigation to get on with their 
lives, the better.’ This decision, like Nicholson’s artwork, recalls the 
theme of the conference, dissents and dispositions, and how the law is 
arranged and subsequently – sometimes violently, as at the moment of 
colonisation, and sometimes through tempered judicial language – 
rearranged. 
Yet, unlike Nicholson’s artwork, the decision was bound to words, 
performed first in the stage of the courtroom and then transcribed for 
posterity in printed books or online databases. What it was to be in the 
courtroom during Re Lucas – the tears, the touch, the tension – can now 
only be felt through words. As Thom Giddens writes, ‘in reducing artistic 
and creative works into textual accounts, encoding cultural experiences 
and ontologies into sentences and paragraphs, something is lost’ (2017: 
377). Yet most papers in this conference moved beyond the paper to 
read images, films and art and, in this final panel, to perform. There was 
a real, sustained and exciting engagement with different cultural and 
artistic forms; not simply looking at the place of law in society but rather 
exploring its inseparable connection with culture and, in so doing, 
collapsing false distinctions between law and culture. Nicholson’s 
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artwork that reads as a collapsed wall seems especially relevant for this 
boundary-breaking interdisciplinary conference. 
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